News Release

Effective global regulation

Peer-Reviewed Publication

Economic & Social Research Council

Government ownership of banks – something unthinkable until very recently for the 'Anglo-Saxon' model of capitalism –- became a reality early in 2008. This was a policy response to an unprecedented global financial crisis, aimed at preventing financial meltdown. It succeeded in doing so, according to Professor Panicos Demetriades, an Economist funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) at the Department of Economics of the University of Leicester.

The main lesson of Professor Demetriades' research for the current crisis is that government owned banks should not be privatised before depositors can be confident that an effective system of financial regulation is in place. This is much easier said than done in the context of markets in which the lack of transparency, the complexity of products and international linkages make the design of an effective global regulatory structure a gargantuan task.

Professor Demetriades said, "The signs of large scale bank runs and the collapse of banking systems were clearly visible in the horizon, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. If Lehman Brothers could collapse, others were likely to follow, which explains the panic selling of bank shares that we observed. In situations like these – given information imperfections – even the most prudent banks are affected, hence the danger of financial meltdown was a very real one. As depositors too began to lose faith in private banks, funds fled to the only safe haven – government bonds and government owned banks."

The presence of deposit insurance did little to reassure depositors. This was in part because deposit insurance is rarely a blanket guarantee of all deposits (e.g. local authorities and businesses are not normally covered). Even if it was one, the prospect of filing for compensation of lost deposits is a much inferior alternative to having one's money safe in a government owned bank.

Until recently, government ownership of banks was frowned upon as a feature of developing countries. Moreover, it was widely seen as politically motivated. Some economists argued that government ownership of banks is widespread because of the benefits it confers on politicians – hence this is known as the 'political view of state banks'. They also argued, drawing on cross-country correlations, that it is associated with financial instability and low growth. They therefore concluded that bank privatisation would result in faster economic growth and fewer banking crises. Earlier this year, Leicester University academics Svetlana Andrianova and Panicos Demetriades and Brunel's Anja Shortland published an article in the Journal of Development Economics which challenges these views. Even though their paper was written with developing countries in mind, most of its conclusions are applicable to the current crisis.

"Recent events", explains Demetriades "make it easy to see why previous experience on the 'political view' of state banks is flawed. The positive correlation that arises in a cross-country relationship between government ownership of banks and financial crises frequently reflects reverse causality i.e. private banks that fail end up under government ownership because no other investor would buy them. Moreover, the financial crisis that preceded the government takeovers of banks is normally followed by severe recessions. To ascribe the blame to governments is like arguing that hospitals are the causes of ill health because they are associated with illness."

In terms of real world examples, Russia provides a good example in which the state savings bank - Sberbank - is able to attract the largest proportion of deposits while offering deposit rates that are lower than its private sector competitors. Northern Rock – nationalised by the UK government in 2007 - is now another case in point: despite offering low interest rates it was massively oversubscribed and had to turn depositors away.

The paper by Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland utilises a theoretical model which demonstrates that government owned banks are a safe haven for depositors when regulatory institutions that govern the behaviour of banks are perceived by depositors as weak. At the extreme, the presence of unchecked opportunistic behaviour by private banks results in a complete preference for the government owned bank by all depositors. Privatising the government bank under these circumstances can only result in financial dis-intermediation i.e. depositors withdrawing their funds from the banking system altogether.

Empirical analyis, within the paper utilises data on 108 countries from the World Bank survey on banking practices and regulation, and the World Bank database of governance indicators. The estimations show that regulatory quality and disclosure are inversely related to government ownership of banks. The empirical findings also suggest that increased government ownership is positively associated with prior banking crises frequently involving (private) bank failures.

The paper warns, however, against interpreting this in a naive way: just like in the current crisis, the correlation between government ownership of banks and financial instability often reflects reverse causation i.e. governments tend to take over failed private banks. Hence, the paper concludes that privatisation of government owned banks is not be the best way forward in terms of developing banking systems, where institutions are weak. Institutions building should be the top priority.

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT:
Professor Panicos Demetriades, Email: pd28@le.ac.uk, Telephone: 0116-2522835.

ESRC Press Office:
Kelly Barnett, telephone 01793 413032, mobile 07826 874166, email Kelly.barnett@esrc.ac.uk
Danielle Moore, telephone 01793 413122, email Danielle.moore@esrc.ac.uk

University of Leicester Press Office
Ather Mirza, telephone 0116 252 3335, mobile 07711 927821, email pressoffice@le.ac.uk

Notes to Editors

1.The paper puts forward a theoretical model and empirical evidence which suggest that government ownership of banks is both a symptom and a substitute for weak regulation and ineffective depositor protection. Furthermore, the paper shows that privatising government owned banks without strengthening institutions that protect depositors from bank failures is likely to result in financial dis-intermediation i.e. depositors withdrawing their money from the banking system.

2.The paper shows that there are three types of equilibria, which depend on the values of the parameters determining the degree of opportunism and the strength of institutions. A 'High Equilibrium' (HE) in which depositors prefer private banks, and the government bank is, therefore, redundant - this prevails when institutional quality is sufficiently high to deter opportunistic behaviour by private banks. This equilibrium was intended to explain developed economies with effective regulation. It is now evident that the sample of these countries is a very small one. At the other extreme, there is a 'Low Equilibrium' (LE) in which there are no private banks, because institutional quality is low and the proportion of opportunistic banks is high. Government ownership of banks here is the only viable option – the alternative is the absence of financial intermediation altogether as depositors do not trust private banks. There is also an 'Intermediate Equilibrium' (IE), in which the government bank and private banks co-exist, which prevails at intermediate ranges of the parameters. In the intermediate region – which is now applicable to almost all countries in the world - the demand for government deposit contracts declines when institutions are strengthened or the proportion of opportunistic banks declines. The paper presents stylised facts as well as empirical results which accord well with these theoretical predictions.

3.The paper was part of the ESRC's National and International Aspects of Financial Development, RES-156-25-0009. Full details are available at http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/ViewAwardPage.aspx?data=RES-156-25-0009

4.Reference: S. Andrianova, P. Demetriades and A. Shortland 'Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions and Financial Development', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 85, 218-252, (available online at Science Direct).

5.The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is the UK's largest funding agency for research, data resources and postgraduate training relating to social and economic issues. It supports independent, high quality research which impacts on business, the public sector and the third sector. The ESRC's planned total expenditure in 2008/09 is £203 million. At any one time the ESRC supports over 4,000 researchers and postgraduate students in academic institutions and research policy institutes. More at http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk

6.Founded in 1921, the University of Leicester has more than 20,000 students from 136 countries. Teaching in 18 subject areas has been graded Excellent by the Quality Assurance Agency- including 14 successive scores - a consistent run of success matched by just one other UK University. Leicester is world renowned for the invention of DNA Fingerprinting by Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys and houses Europe's biggest academic Space Research Centre. 90% of staff are actively engaged in high quality research and 13 subject areas have been awarded the highest rating of 5* and 5 for research quality, demonstrating excellence at an international level. The University's research grant income places it among the top 20 UK research universities. The University employs over 3,000 people, has an annual turnover of over £200m, covers an estate of 94 hectares and is engaged in a £300m investment programme- among the biggest of any UK university.

  • Named University of the Year by Times Higher (2008) Shortlisted (2006, 2005) and by the Sunday Times (2007)
  • Ranked second to Cambridge for student satisfaction amongst full time students taught at mainstream universities in England
  • Ranked as a Top 20 university by the Sunday Times, Guardian,Times and UK Complete University Guide, published in The Independent
  • Ranked in world's top 200 universities by Shanghai Jiao Tong International Index, 2005-08 and the Times Higher Education-QS World University Rankings
  • Ranked top 10 in England for research impact by The Guardian
  • Students' Union of the Year award 2005, short listed 2006 and 2007


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