The authors demonstrate how the elasticity of demand is crucial to understanding the effects of punishment on suppliers. Enforcement raises costs for suppliers, who must respond to the risk of imprisonment and other punishments. This cost is passed on to the consumer, which induces lower consumption when demand is relatively elastic. However, in the case of illegal goods like drugs--where demand seems inelastic--higher prices lead not to less use, but to an increase in total spending.
In the case of drugs, then, the authors argue that excise taxes and persuasive techniques -such as advertising--are far more effective uses of enforcement expenditures.
"This analysis...helps us understand why the War on Drugs has been so difficult to win...why efforts to reduce the supply of drugs leads to violence and greater power to street gangs and drug cartels," conclude the authors. "The answer lies in the basic theory of enforcement developed in this paper."
JPE has been presenting significant research and scholarship in economic theory and practice since its inception in 1892. Publishing analytical, interpretive, and empirical studies, the Journal presents work in traditional areas--monetary theory, fiscal policy, labor economics, development, micro- and macroeconomic theory, international trade and finance, industrial organization, and social economics. For more information, please visit: www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE.
Becker, Gary, Kevin Murphy, and Michael Grossman. "The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs." Journal of Political Economy 114:1.