EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVITY IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA (IMAGE)

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVITY IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Caption

Two simulated populations followed over 2,000 generations. One tips into near total cooperation and stays there. The other collapses into selfishness. Each line is the average cooperativity of a population; the shaded band is the spread between its individuals. Cooperation does not creep upward gradually. It stays contested for a while, then flips and becomes stable, and it survives even when new selfish mutants keep appearing.

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Credit: Morozov & Feigel

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