BRIGHTON, BERLIN and BRUSSELS, [Oct 27, 2026]. On 20 November, António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen host Prime Minister Andy Burnham in Brussels for the second EU-UK summit. The announced agenda covers defence, energy, agrifood rules, climate and migration. Despite recent reports of AI agents breaking out of their test and environments and more than 1,100 industry employees asking governments for brakes, Artificial Intelligence is not on the table.
A new white paper published by researchers from the universities of Sussex, Cambridge, Bologna, Macerata and Innsbruck, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, the Max Planck Society, the Hasso Plattner Institute, the German Environment Agency and civil society argues that the time for AI regulation is now, and that the EU and the UK must take the lead. The paper specifies thirteen rules that EU and UK governments should advance.
“The AI debate is around safety, and the white paper agrees that redlines on models must be established and liability of their publishing companies enforced. However, this overlooks the fact that that the most widespread harms of AI are fiscal and physical, and that AI companies are already harming people,” says Jochen Büttner, coauthor from the Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology.
A Tax Code that Favors People over Machines
Tax systems were built for an economy in which value comes from wages. In the United States, effective tax rates are 25.5% to 33.5% on labor and about 5% on equipment and software. Across the OECD, labor supplies about 57% of tax revenue and capital about 19%. When a company replaces people with software, it cuts wages and tax bills and the public purse loses twice: in revenue and in the cost of supporting displaced workers. The exposure is large. The International Labour Organization estimates that one in four jobs worldwide, and 34% in high-income countries, is in an occupation exposed to generative AI. The white paper proposes to end tax rules that favor automation over employment, to introduce a usage-based levy on compute, and to return part of the value of appropriated data to the public.
"The fiscal base is shifting from labor to capital faster than tax authorities can follow,” says Jürgen Renn, another coauthor from the MPI of Geoanthropology. “Without reform, AI will be paid for by cuts to the services that cushion the AI generated unemployment and job insecurity."
Make Technology Green Again
Digital technology once promised dematerialisation: less paper, fewer journeys, smarter grids. The AI boom goes the opposite direction. On 6 October, a Finnish agency ordered Google's local subsidiary to halt work at two data-centre sites after about 300 hectares of forest had been cleared without permission. In the United States, xAI runs about 1.5 GW of gas turbines in Memphis, Meta has committed to ten gas-fired plants for its Louisiana campus, and 59 data-centre projects have announced some 90 GW of onsite generation built on gas turbines and engines. In Spain, two thirds of data centres have water demand exceeding local supply in parts of the year. The International Energy Agency reports that data-centre electricity demand rose 17% in 2025, against 3% for electricity demand overall. The UK is accelerating consent for data centres in AI Growth Zones without binding conditions on efficiency, water or waste heat. It is unclear why big tech gets away where local European companies always had been regulated for. To that end, the paper calls for regulators to set environmental limits on compute and to make resource use disclosure mandatory for data centres.
Europe has the Levers
The EU and the UK together account for roughly a quarter of global AI demand. The Brussels’ effect shows that conditions attached to the common European market tend to become global corporate standards. But the supply side of the equation matters too. Every leading-edge AI chip is printed with lithography made only by ASML in the Netherlands, optics provided by Carl Zeiss. Since 2 August, the European Commission has held enforcement powers over general-purpose AI models. On 21 September, it opened a consultation on minimum performance standards for data centres. The white paper argues that the EU already has the legislative backbone and now must strengthen it in collaboration with the UK.
"Europe discusses AI as if the only question were safety in Silicon Valley," says Felix Creutzig, lead author, of the Bennett Institute at the University of Sussex. "The harm closer to home is a tax system that rewards replacing people with software, and a digital sector that used to be green and is turning black, with forests cleared in Finland and gas turbines in Memphis. The 20 November summit is the opportunity to put the rules on the table."
The paper proposes an overarching licence to operate for general-purpose AI in both EU and the UK, in addition to twelve substantive rules across democracy, labor and equity, planetary health and safety. The authors call on EU and UK leaders to add AI to the summit declaration, to agree a joint licence to operate, and to carry common standards for data centres and taxation into the UK's G20 presidency in 2027.
Key rules and the laws to use
|
Rule |
What it requires |
Legal vehicle |
|
Licence to operate (rule 1) |
No certificate, no market: EU and UK access for general-purpose AI conditional on demonstrated compliance, tightening on a published schedule; exports of EUV lithography conditional on downstream compliance |
AI Act Arts. 51(2) and 97 by delegated act; UK frontier AI bill; Dual-Use Regulation Art. 4 |
|
Taxation (rule 7) |
End tax treatment favouring automation over employment; usage-based levy on compute or tokens collected on the destination principle; levy on data appropriation feeding a public fund |
Member-state tax law with EU coordination; UK Finance Bill on the Digital Services Tax model; OECD |
|
Environmental limits on compute (rule 9) |
Data-centre consent and grid connection only with additional renewable supply; power usage effectiveness of at most 1.2 and minimum waste-heat reuse; consent withheld where impact cannot be assessed |
Germany's Energy Efficiency Act thresholds as permit conditions; Irish grid-connection rule; EU minimum performance standards (2027); UK National Policy Statement for data centres |
|
Life-cycle disclosure (rule 8) |
Public energy and water figures per facility and per model, across training and inference, including upstream mining and e-waste |
Amend Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1364 Art. 5 from confidential filing to publication; extend EED Art. 12 |
|
Labour across the AI supply chain (rule 4) |
Human review of algorithmic pay and dismissal decisions; collective bargaining for data and moderation workers; due diligence reaching contractors abroad |
Platform Work Directive Arts. 6 to 8 extended; CSDDD |
|
Gatekeeping oversight (rule 2) |
Fair ranking in AI answers, no self-preferencing, auditable retrieval logs; remuneration for authors whose works trained the models |
DMA Art. 6(5) extended; UK DMCCA conduct requirements; CDSM Directive review |
|
Competition and market shaping (rule 3) |
Systemic-importance designation keyed to compute share; merger approval conditional on open access; procurement that rewards capability-extending AI |
DMCCA s. 2 pattern; EU Merger Regulation remedies; Cloud and AI Development Act assurance tiers |
|
Safety (rules 10 to 12) |
Red lines on containment escape, deception and shutdown resistance; pre-deployment evaluations with regulator-set thresholds in isolated environments; liability with the model provider |
AI Act Arts. 5 and 55; AISI statutory access; Product Liability Directive |
|
Implementation (rule 13) |
Complete the standards layer; a European AI Impact Observatory independent of the AI Office |
AI Act Arts. 40, 41 and 68 |
Method of Research
Commentary/editorial
Article Title
Thirteen Rules for Advancing AI Regulation in Europe
Article Publication Date
12-Oct-2026