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Researchers identify 137 supply chain elements for global AI production. They compare these to government documents from dozens of countries and find 33% of the elements, mainly from the “physical middle” of AI production (such as wafers, packaging and networking), are largely absent from top-level AI policy worldwide.
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“AI sovereignty” is an impossibility for any one nation, including the US and China, and countries such as Japan and the UK have far more influence over the supply of AI than they realise, say experts. A country-by-country report is available alongside the main report.
As much as a third of the AI supply chain receives no attention from national and international policymaking and regulation, according to a new Cambridge report that reveals a vast “zone of invisibility” in the middle of global AI production.
A University of Cambridge team found vulnerabilities across 14 supply-chain layers, with 137 elements produced or convened in over fifty countries. Many critical “chokepoints” sit outside the AI powerhouses of China and the US.
“The US and China are central to the AI story, but this research shows us the extent to which critical technologies and materials across the AI stack have dependencies that extend far beyond their borders,” said Verity Harding, Director of the AI and Geopolitics project. “It shows that no one country can control the AI supply chain alone.”
One Japanese firm has a 95% market share of a material needed for AI chips, the report shows. Even notorious chokepoints depend on other nations: the Dutch firm dominating EUV lithography (ASML) relies on essential parts controlled by German and US companies.
In fact, the study suggests that countries such as Japan, Germany, and some so-called middle powers – from Belgium to South Korea – have far more leverage over global AI production than even their own governments realise.
Researchers describe an “unexpected mismatch” between a nation’s top AI policy documents and its actual positions in the supply chain, calling it a “universal pattern”.
“Most policy discussions reduce artificial intelligence to just a few inputs, such as compute, data and models. This is not an accurate understanding of the complexity of the AI supply chain,” said lead author Dr Siyi Liu.
“Many governments are unaware of the strengths and vulnerabilities they hold at the heart of the global AI supply chain. Understanding this will be the basis of credible bargaining power in AI governance.” she added.
The UK is involved in 41 of the 137 supply-chain elements researchers identify, yet its AI policies name just three, ignoring UK specialisms in chip design and industrial gases. Japan is second only to the US in terms of supply-chain positions, yet its AI policy documents recognise only three.
Cambridge researchers analysed 117 AI-related policy documents from 43 countries and territories, the EU and OECD, and found a fixation on models and datacentres, as well as funding and governance, while the factories, chemicals, chip-design software and packaging technologies vital to the AI supply chain are completely overlooked.
Disruption to any one of these “upstream” components could trigger a domino effect that leads to AI supply shortages, potentially destabilising stock markets, investment and productivity around the world.
Experts from the AI & Geopolitics Project (AIxGEO) at Cambridge’s Bennett School of Public Policy say that total “AI sovereignty”, a nation autonomously operating its own AI supply chain – a goal many nations hint at pursuing – is “impossible”.
The research team created a toolkit for governments to audit their place in the chain. They say it will help policymakers understand where and when to diversify across AI element providers, who they depend on, or when to “exit” entirely from an outside supplier and build national capacity.
For the latest study, the AIxGEO team comprehensively mapped the global AI supply chain to reveal 14 distinct layers, from the raw minerals and the ultra-pure gases needed for semiconductors, to the wafers, chips and servers, and eventually the trained models. Cross-cutting layers include governance standards and shipping routes.
Breaking it down, researchers identified 137 specific “elements”, such as gallium or hyperscale cloud platforms, with a further 351 “sub-elements”: tech specs that determine who can supply it. Nearly 800 firms identified hold supply-chain positions across 56 countries and territories.
However, the team’s analysis of AI policy and regulation documents from dozens of countries as well as intergovernmental organisations shows that just over 33% of the identified supply-chain elements are simply not mentioned.
Most of this “invisibility” is in the “physical middle” of the chain. This includes chip design, packaging and the testing of chips, and some of the hardware and software behind “compute” such as making AI servers and “merchant accelerators” (platforms that allow businesses to adopt AI).
An example of a hidden chokepoint highlighted by the report is the EDA (Electronic Design Automation) software used to design AI chips. It is essential for companies like NVIDIA, AMD and Google.
This software is dominated by three firms – Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens EDA in the US – yet receives almost no policy attention, unlike the chips and LLMs that wouldn’t exist without it.
Another major “blind spot” is advanced packaging: connecting multiple semiconductor chips into high-performance AI processors essential for frontier models. This packaging is overwhelmingly concentrated in Asian countries and territories such as Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines.
“Policymakers focus on finished chips rather than the ecosystem behind them. They focus on GPUs but ignore the packaging operations needed to turn those chips into usable AI hardware,” said Liu.
Japan emerges as the world’s most underrated AI power, with the second largest number of supply chain positions, directly ahead of China. The report shows 101 Japanese firms hold positions across 69 elements, from silicon wafers to semiconductor testing. However, Japan’s own policy documents feature only three of these elements.
The researchers point out that a Japanese company, Ajinomoto, controls more than 95% of the global supply of build-up film, an insulating material needed for advanced AI chip manufacturing.
“Japan’s strength comes from equipment, and without it there's no way you can produce the hardware,” said Liu. “The supply chain is sequential, so the trickle down could affect computing capacities of the top frontier models.”
The UK has little AI-related manufacturing, but holds leverage in chip design IP through Cambridge company Arm (even with majority Japanese SoftBank ownership). It is a base for research and expertise, particularly in AI security, and home to valuable health and genomic datasets.
The report highlights absences from reviewed UK policy where it has footholds in the supply chain, such as chip design, and the pure gases needed for semiconductor plants via Linde, one of the world's largest industrial gas companies.
Some of the smaller nations with more clout than they might realise include Belgium, which is strong in recycled semiconductor chemicals and has the major nanoelectronics R&D centre Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (imec).
Ireland has no production supply-chain position, yet it can affect AI capacity through energy and planning as it provides a European base for big US tech e.g. Google and AMD, making it a “host and infrastructure state”. While Qatar produces much of the world’s helium, a vital supply-chain raw material, and is also a huge potential AI investor.
Earlier this year, Nvidia’s former-CEO Jensen Huang described the AI supply chain as a “five-layer cake” (energy, chips, infrastructure, models, and applications).
Verity Harding added: “The AI supply chain is far more complex, and power over it far more diffused, than some simplified narratives might have us believe. Many governments hold more cards than they realise.”
Notes:
The 14 supply chain layers identified by the report: minerals that must be scooped and refined; ultra-pure gases and chemicals required by a fabrication plant or facility; wafers; machines that print the circuits; chips; memory and packaging around chips; servers; data centres; power and cooling that run data centres; cloud platforms; data; models.
About the AI & Geopolitics project (AIxGEO)
AIxGEO, led by Verity Harding, exists to interrogate the framing of AI development as a zero-sum arms race between two superpowers, and to shift the policy debate towards a more cooperative future so the technology can deliver the broad benefits it promises.
About the Bennett School of Public Policy
The Bennett School is a leading school of public policy in the UK and wider world, for public policy thinking, research, teaching and engagement with practitioners from policy, business and civic organisations. Drawing on Cambridge’s broad talent base, it supports effective decision-making through interdisciplinary research, training, and collaboration.
Article Title
The invisible AI supply chain
Article Publication Date
18-Nov-2026