Cybersecurity threats to power grids do not always come from outside. People with legitimate access to power systems can also create pathways for attacks, whether through malicious actions or by assisting external attackers. As information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) become more closely connected, these trusted access pathways can expose critical operations to risks that conventional perimeter defences may not adequately address.
A study published in Cyber-Physical Energy Systems examines how insider and external threats can affect power transmission systems differently. The study’s researchers from Michigan Technological University and the University of Michigan-Dearborn found that the key distinction is not simply how an attack begins, but how easily it can progress through the systems and organisations that support grid operations. The study’s framework offers a way to assess these interacting risks by estimating the long-run probabilities of different system states and considering their potential consequences. It could complement established requirements, including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards, by providing a probabilistic perspective on risk alongside compliance-based evaluation.
“External attackers may need to overcome multiple barriers to reach sensitive operational systems,” explains Roman Sidortsov. “Insiders, or attackers who gain assistance from people with legitimate access, may be able to exploit existing privileges and knowledge of system operations to bypass some of these barriers.”
In the researchers' model, such attacks can reach high-impact system states through fewer, more probable transitions. This means that fewer observable attack steps do not necessarily indicate lower risk.
The team's findings highlighted a limitation of relying on perimeter protection and procedural compliance alone. “Cybersecurity risks also depend on how access is granted and used, how organisations manage trusted relationships, and how technical systems are connected,” says Sidortsov. “An attack that begins with a compromised account or trusted access pathway may have consequences beyond the initially affected system as it moves across interconnected IT and OT environments.”
To examine how different safeguards affect these risks, the researchers simulated several cybersecurity measures, including network segmentation, privileged access workstations, intrusion detection and security information and event management, and secure firmware validation. “Under balanced risk weighting, zero-trust segmentation achieved the lowest normalised defender objective among the evaluated policies, improving on the baseline by 7.6%,” shares Lawrence Dilworth. “It also reduced modelled cyber-compromise exposure by 68.55%. Privileged access workstations had a different benefit, reducing modelled cyber-physical coupling exposure by 45.58%.”
However, no single measure substantially reduced all the major risk dimensions considered in the simulations. Some measures lowered the likelihood of cyber compromise while leaving greater residual risk associated with the propagation of attacks into more consequential states. The preferred measure also varied with the assumed mix of external, insider and supply-chain threats.
“The results suggest that protecting power grids requires more than selecting one leading security control: safeguards need to address different stages of an attack, from restricting access and lateral movement to detecting intrusions, containing their spread and supporting recovery,” says Dilworth.
“The simulations illustrate how the effectiveness of cybersecurity measures can depend on who is attacking and how an attack may progress,” adds Sidortsov. “For power grid operators, the central implication is that trusted access deserves explicit attention in security planning. A layered approach that combines access controls, network segmentation, monitoring and recovery measures is better suited to addressing varied threat pathways than reliance on perimeter defences or procedural compliance alone.”
Contact the Authors:
Chee-Wooi Ten*, Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI 49931, USA, ten@mtu.edu
Lawrence Dilworth, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI 49931, USA
Junho Hong, Associate Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, MI 48128, USA
Swetha Rani Kasimalla, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, MI 48128, USA
Roman Sidortsov, Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI 49931, USA
The publisher KeAi was established by Elsevier and China Science Publishing & Media Ltd to unfold quality research globally. In 2013, our focus shifted to open access publishing. We now proudly publish more than 300 world-class, open access, English language journals, spanning all scientific disciplines. Many of these are titles we publish in partnership with prestigious societies and academic institutions, such as the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC).
Journal
Cyber-Physical Energy Systems
Article Title
The emerging landscape of cyberthreats in SCADA deployment
COI Statement
All authors declare that there are no competing interest.